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Writing  Genealogies: an  exploration of  Foucault's  strategies for 
doing  research 
MAR IA TAMBO U KOU 
'Meeting' Foucault 
Like many people of my generation, when I was young I thought that the world needed 
dramatic changes and that I  should do something about it. After spending several years 
actively involved in various off-mainstream political and feminist groups, I foun d myself 
trapped in an impasse of both theory and practice . It was the early 1980s in Greece; 
Europe was changing, the world was changing and theories seemed insufficient to 
account for what was happening. In the early 1990s I decided Lo leave Greece and 
escape to London. Jn my attempt to make a new start, I became interested in politics 
once more, but this time it was definitely politics with a small 'p'. It was then that I 'met' 
Foucau lt and had the idea of focusing my research on his work. Foucau lt's work came 
as an inspiration in a period when all political theory seemed dry to me and when 
political activi ty was no longer on the agenda. I thi nk that my interest in Foucau lt 
coincided with a critical period in my life, when, dislocating myself from familiar spaces 
and places, l had felt the need to experiment with new modes of thinking and perhaps 
with new modes of being. 
J n following Foucault, I think that I have become passionately interested in a wider 
shift in the European intellectual landscape: the return of ethics as a primary issue in the 
philosophical agenda, after so many years of the primary position of pol itics. I think that 
far from abandoning politics, this shift has been working towards redefining the subject(s) 
of politics and the very notion of P/politics itself. Following Foucault 's intellectual paths, 
and especially his suggestion for writing genealogies, turned out to be an exciting 
adventure. There were a lot of things to be discovered. Foucault had used the term 
'genealogy' to describe his work, but he insisted on not following any certain method ol- 
ogy to do that. On the contrary he was against  all closed types of methodologies and 
instead he was continually slipping away from being committed to any of them. His 
intellectual work has been rather a move to go 'beyond' any existing theories and/or 
methodologies, yet he kept on referring again and again lo his works as genealogies. This 
paper is therefore focusing on the very ontology of the Foucauldian genealogy, being 
aware of 1.he vanity of any attempt to frame the Foucauldian genealogy as a  closed 
method   for  research,   bu t  at  the  same  time  acknow ledging  the  need  to  map   the 
Foucauldian genealogy in a cartography of contemporary problematics upon social and 
historical research. Therefore: 
What is Genealogy? 
In trying to work out this question, I think I should make clear that this paper is 
not attempting to open new directions in the philosophical and /or epistemological 
debate on Foucault's theories. Drawing on inufluential theorisations of the Foucauldian 
methodology Iwill attempt to bring together those critical pieces that illuminate the 
dark tunnel of the genealogical method and  make it 'usable'. Why and how to use 
genealogy as a critical tool is what I want to illustrate, but to do t h i s  I  cannot help 
reflecting on, first of all, the ontology of the method. Therefore, what is genealogy? 
Foucault has written lovely histories. Although tempting, however, Foucauldian 
histories have been  highly interrogated. Foucault  himself has written: 
I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than fictions. For 
all that I would not want co say that they were outside the truth. It seems 
plausible to me to make fiction s work within truth, to introduce truth 
effects with a fictional discourse, and in some way to make discourse 
arouse, 'fabricate' something which does not yet exist, thus to fiction 
something. One 'fictions' history starting from a political reality that 
renders it true, one 'fictions' a politi cs that does not yet exist starting from 
a historical truth. (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1 982, p. 204) 
Against what are seen as traditional types of history, Foucault has proposed the 
Nietzschean theme of genealogy. This is what he calls the  form  of his reflection  on 
the nature and  development  of modern  power. A key Nictzschean  insight  for Foucault 
is that truth can not be separated from the procedures of its production. The philoso- 
pher's task is therefore to criticise, diagnose and demythologise 'truth phenomena'. 
Consequently genealogy is concerned with the processes, procedures and apparatuses by 
which truth and knowledge are produced, in what Foucaul t calls the discu rsive regime 
of the modern era. Instead of asking in which kinds of discourse we are entitled  to 
believe, Foucault 's genealogies pose the question of which kinds of practices tied to which 
kinds of external condition s determin e the different knowledges in which we ourselves 
figure. 
Drawing on the Enlightenment suggestion of 'emancipation from self-imposed imma- 
turi ty' (cited in Rajchman , 1985, p. 56) the Foucauldian genealogy reflects on the present 
of philosophy as well as the philosopher's self-positioning and active intervention within 
thjs  present: 
• What is happening now?
• What is this 'now ' within which all of us find ourselves?
According to Foucault these questions of the Aeflarung or of reason have been a central 
theme of philosophy from Kant to our own day. It is within  the tradition  of this form 
of phil osophical thinking from Hegel through Nietzsche and Max Weber to the Frankfurt 
school that Foucault situates himself and his inquiries. 'What is it in the present that 
produces meaning for philosophical  reflection?' (Foucault, in Kritzm an  Laurence,  1988, 
p. 87). Like Kant, Foucault sees the present as a process that embodies thought,
knowledge and philosophy. In reframing the Kantian questions, however, Foucault 
follows different trails to explore them. 
Discussing the Enlightenment roots of Foucault's genealogical project, Dreyfus and 
Rabi now ( 1982, p. 122) have written, 'Analytics today must find a way of taking seriously 
the problems and conceptual needs of the past, but not the solutions and conclusions 
based on them.' Jane Flax has also pointed out that the Enlightenment poses an 
important series of questions 'that still have value apart from their contaminated answers' 
(Flax, 1990, p. 236). 
In examining the very Kantian concept of the present, Foucault introduces scepticism 
about universalist dogmas of truth, objectivity and pure scientific reason, and interrogates 
the supposed interconnections between reason , knowledge, progress, freedom and ethical 
action. Within this problematic, Foucault also attempts to sec differen tly the role of the 
t11inking subject, by first of all recognising the historical dimen sion of all human reality. 
In elaborating new answers to Kantian questions, Foucault moves to an analysis of the 
different discursive and non-di scursive ways in which the subject emerges in history. 
Genealogy conceives human reality as an effect of the interweaving of certain historical 
and cultural practices, which it sets out to trace and explore. I nstead of seeing history as 
a continuous development of an ideal schema, genealogy is oriented lo discontinuities. 
Throughou t the genealogical  exploration  there are frequent disruptions,  uneven  and 
haphazard processes of dispersion , that mil into question the supposed linear evolution 
of history. In this context of reversal, our present is not theorised  as the result of a 
meaningful development, but rather as an episode, a result of struggle and relations of 
force and domination. Genealogy is the history of such fights, their deep strategies, and 
the ways that interconnect them . Foucault has argued 1 that within relation s of power,
individuals and groups can find space to resist domination, exercise freedom and pursue 
their interests.  He has thus drawn a significan t line of distinction between relations of 
power, as fields of games where freedom can be exercised and relations of domination , 
which needs resisting. While this distinction overturns arguments that his theorisation of 
power leaves no possibility of freedom, it is, however, a blurring distinction, which has 
created certain tensions in genealogical research  that seeks to trace specific 'drawings' of 
this line. As it has been suggested, 'where do the various medical, psychiatric  and 
carceral systems of surveillance and discipline, detailed in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 
1991) and elsewhere, stand in relation to that distinction? ' (Maggi!, 1997, p. 66). As I will 
argue further on in this paper, such theoretical  questions  and  philosophical  aporias, 
raised by the use of genealogy, are more effectively worked out in the actual 'writing' of 
specific genealogies. Whether they are 'solved' or surpassed becomes a task and a 
challenge for the genealogist. 
However, while genealogy focuses on the war of discourses and power relations , it does 
not slop there. By revealing discontinuities in the supposed continuous development of 
history, Foucault's genealogical project also implies a discontinuity in the present social 
formations. Genealogy is attempting to go further by tracing possible ways of thinking 
differently, instead of accepting and legitimating what arc already the 'truths' of our 
world. The aim is to provide a counter-memory that will help subjects recreat e the 
historical and practical conditions of their present existence. This is the future to which 
genealogies aspire: opening possibilities for life, by separating us from 'ilie contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibili1y of no longer being, doing or thinking what 
we are, do, or tl1ink' (Mahon , 1992, p. 122). 
Searching Foucault 
There is today  a vast  literature  related  to  the  genealogical  method  as well  as various 
readings of it, which,  although  not  always  outright  contradictory,  unfold  the  Foucauldian 
method  in  various   dimensions.   Despite   their   different  perspectives,  however, the 
analysts who have  become  attentive  to  Foucault's work  stand  on  a common  ground, the 
ground that according to Foucault  'is once  more  stirring  under  our  feet'  (Foucault, 1970, 
p. xxiv). Foucault's thinking strategies have emerged from 'the void left by man's
disappearance' (Foucault, cited  in  Braidotti ,  1991, p.  1),  the  instability  that  was  created 
by the questioning of 'subjectivity' and 'rationality', Lhe discourses  of  the  'crisis'  of 
modernity. As Foucault has mostly  eloquently  put  it,  'this  void  docs  not  create  a 
deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is  nothing  more, and 
nothing else, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think' 
(Foucault, cited in Braidotti, 1991, p. !). Foucault's work and the Literature  that  has 
revolved around it have therefore been unfolded in the spatial void  of  the  crisis  of 
modernity ,  along   with    other   theories    that    have    thematised    the    relation    between 
language, subjectivity, social organisation  and power.2
In their influential study Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1982) trace the  roots  of Foucault's challenging  ideas.  What is  remarkable  in  this  study 
is the adoption of the  term  'interpretive  analytics'  to  capture  the  quintessence  of 
Foucault's philosophical reflections. The study tries to follow Foucault's intellectual adventures: 
his initial  reaction  to  the phenomenological  methodologies  he  first dealt with in his 
studies; his detachment from the tradition of hermeneutic ontology of his earliest writings; 
his surpassing  the  influence  of structuralism,  which  resulted  in  the  'bracketing' of 
archaeology and his tum to Nietzsche and  genealogy.   According  to   Dreyfus  and Rabinow, 
situating Foucault in the map of philosophical t.l1inking requires an under- standing of those 
approaches that have tried to surpass the conception  of  a  mca11i11g- giving transcendental 
subject, a  key conception of phenomenology . As a response to phenomenology, the 
structuralist approach rejected both concepts, meaning  and  subject, arguing instead that t.l1ere 
arc objective laws governing all human  activity,  while hermeneutics kept meaning as a 
theme of philosophical investigation, situating  it  in  the social practi ces and literary texts that 
it set out to explore. Dreyfus and  Rabinow  see Foucault 's thought grappling with concepts 
arising from those three positions: phe-nomenology, structuralism and hermeneutics. Having 
abandoned the phenomenological strategy of defining the ontology of a transcendental 
meaning subject as well  as  the activities derived from 'him',  Foucault  was  also  critical  of 
the  structuralist  elimination  of all meaning and the project of seeing the world governed 
merely by rules, principles and structures. Finally he tried to avoid the continuous search  for 
the  deeper  meaning  of social practices and actors. Indeed he was concerned  to  demonstrate 
the  cultural construction of the very notion of 'deep meaning' and he worked towards a 
method of analysis that would go  beyond  the  above  alternatives,  while  remaining  aware 
of  both their  'truths'  and   their  flaws. 
For the philosopher Gilles Deleuze , what is most fascinating i n Foucault's work is the 
joy  and gaiety of the writing itself, which  reveals  Foucault as a poetic philosopher, one 
who  succeeds  in  deeply  enchanting  his audience.  Deleuze  notes  that  Foucault 's  work 
reveals three important dimensions of writing: 'to write is to struggle and resist, to write 
is  to  become,   to  write  is  to  draw  a  map'  (Deleuze,   1992,  p. 44).  Drawing  on  a 
self-description of Foucault himself made in an interview in Nouvelles Lilleraires,  17 March 
1975, 'I am  a cartographer',  Deleuze  sees genealogy  as the  act of drawing  maps  or a 
cartography  of  social  diagrams.  But  what  is  a  diagram?  'The  diagram   or  abstract 
machine  is the map of relations  between  forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which 
proceeds  by  primary  non-localisable  relations and  at  every  moment  passes  through  every 
point,  "or rather  in  every  relation  from  one  point  to  the  other"'  (Deleuze,  1992, p. 36). 
Genealogy  provides  a   functional   microanalysis  of  power   rel ations,  operating  on   the 
smallest   and   most  insignificant   details.  These  are   always  local,  but   impossible  to  be 
localised   for   good,   'passing   through    every   point',  producin g  rath er   than    repressing 
reality.   Deleuze   points   out   that   in  The Archaeology   of  Knowledge   Foucault   made  the 
distinction   between   discursive   and  non-discursive  formations  but  dealt  exclusively  \'lith 
the  former.  I t  was  in  the  genealogical  proje ct  of Discipline   and  Punish  that  Foucault's 
methodology   m ade   a   decisive   new   step,   abandoning   the   dualism   of  discursive   and 
non-discursive  fom1ations and  proposing  the  art  of  drawing  a  map  or  a  cartography,  to 
show  how  discursive  and  non-discursive  formations  coexist  in  various  forms  or  corre- 
l lation , opposition   or juxt aposition, pointed  out  by  the  cartographer . Deleuze  notes  that 
just   as  there are  many  diagrams  responding  to  the  various  social  fields  in  history, there 
arc   also   man y   diagrammatic    functions,   since   'every   diagram    is   a  spatio-temporal 
multiplicity'  (Deleuze ,  1992, p. 34).  Every diagram  is  intersocial  and  constantly evolving, 
operating  so  as  to  produ ce  a  new  kind  of  reality, 'by  unmaking  preceding   realities  and 
signification s,  constituting   hundreds   of  points   of  emergence   or   creativity,  unex-pected 
conjunction s or  improbabl e continuum s' (Deleuze , 1992, p. 35).  Genealogy  is  finally  the 
exemplary  means  to illustrate  the linking  of theory  and  practice.  Significantly, Discipl ine 
and  Punish,   the  book   that   initiated   the  genealogical   move   in   Foucault's   work,   was 
published    in    1 975,   immediately    after   Fouca ult's   involvement    in    GIP   (Group   of 
Information  about  Prisons)  between   197 1 and  1975. 
John Rajchman (1985, 1 986, 199 1) offers a new and original interpretation  of 
Foucault's project which he characterises as 'a modem practical philosophy'. He sees 
Foucault's genealogy as a Nietzschean rethinking of the relationship  between freedom 
and truth and fully acknowled ges the critical dimension of the method. Unearthing the 
philosophical grounding of Foucault's historical method, Rachman defines Foucault's 
suggestion for 'doing history' as historical nominalism. Foucault 's nominalist histories arc 
not dealing with things but with terms, categories and techniques that have come to be 
recognised as the great themes of history. Not denying their political perspective, 
Foucault's inquiries are therefore offering a historical answer to the philosophical 
question as to how such things were constituted,  by employing four nominalist 
arguments. 
First is the argument of dispersal, by which Foucault 's analysis disrupts the supposed 
unity of reason, the subject and history. Second is the argument of reversal, shattering 
self-evidences of Western civilisation, like madness or the sovereignty of the slate. In 
Foucault's work the argument of reversal is celebrated in the notorious 'repressive 
hypothesis' by which Foucault calls into question the supposed historical repression of 
everything about and around sex which is itself interrogated as a category or concept. 
Third is the argument of critique which  is at the heart of Foucault 's project. Instead of 
criticising the past in terms of the present, the Foucau ldian histories criticise the present 
by reflecting upon the ways the discursive and institutional practices of the past still affect 
the constitution of the present . Fourth is the argument of singular enlightenment. 
Rajchman chooses the term 'scepticism' to describe Foucault's position in the line of 
philosophical tradition. He argues that as a sceptic Foucault refused to accept given 
dogmas and discourses of his time. For Rajchman, what Foucault aspires to is freedom 
from the restrictions that our history and culture have imposed on the way hum an bein gs 
und erstand the world and themselves. Freedom in the sense described above is therefore 
announ ced  to be  the  ethical principle  of Foucault's scepticism . 
As its title suggests, Mah on's ( 1992) study Foucault 's Nietzschean Genealogy: truth, power, 
and the subject focuses on the Nietzschean aspect of  Foucault 's  methodological  ideas  and  
the way they influenced the emergence of genealogy in the course of his researches. 
Mahon's fundamental argument is that genealogy should first be  conceived  as  critique:  'as  
an attempt   to   reveal   concrete,   practical,   and   historical   conditions   of  existence'  
(Mahon, 1 992, p. 8) defining the target of his study  to 'reveal what  Foucault  means  by  
genealogical critique' (Mahon, 1992, p. 1 7). The study calls into question the previously 
discussed 'passage' of the philosopher from archaeology to genealogy,  by  highlighting  
Foucault's statement: 'No, no, no, ... no,  no, I never stopped doing archaeology.  I  never  
stopped doing genealogy. Genealogy defines the target and  the  finality  of  the  work  and 
archaeology indicates the field witl1 which I deal to make a genealogy' (cited in Mah on, 
1992, p. 2 I 2n). 
In focusing on the micropolitical aspect of Foucault's genealogy, Todd May ( 1 993) 
relates it to the work of critical theorists who, like Foucault, dealt with the analysis of 
rationality. Instead of arguing for or against rationality, Foucault proclaims that reason 
is a complex phenomenon that can neither be r e j e c t e d  nor accepted wholesale. 
Knowledge and truth exist but only as they apply to  specific situations  that  the 
genea logical project sets out to explore in detail. This Foucauldian stance regarding 
rationality seems to inform May's study, which attempts to provide the epistemological 
grounds for Foucault's project as a way of articulating a response to criticisms of Foucault 
made by theorists of the late Frankfurt school. May sees the genealogical project a 
political critique of 11llcropolitical practices aiming to resist them. Resistance is immedi- 
ately bound to freedom as it is unfolded in four different theses in Foucault 's thought: 
first comes the understanding that freedom is not tautological with liberation, second the 
view th at freedom is a matter of concrete struggles for situated values, third a recognition 
of the historical contingency of freedom , and fourth the acceptance that tl1erc is no 
necessary end point in the struggle for freedom. 
In Critical and Effective H istories, Mitchell Dean ( 1994) examines Foucault's genealogies 
through the problematics that arise from the use of history in sociological research. 
Recognising  the impossibility  of 'ranking' Foucault  either  as a historian , or a  philosopher 
or a sociologist or any combination of those three intellectual roles, Dean reflects on the 
ontology of genealogy as a 'history of the  present'  and  traces the relations  of archaeology 
and genealogy as a key step that reveals the potential  of ll1e genealogical  method, to act 
as a critical and effective history. Addressing the theme of rationality, Dean excavates  the 
ways in which Foucault  was  informed  by, but  at  the  same  time  engaged  critically  with the 
concept of rationalisation, the kernel of Max  Weber's  historical  sociology.  Dean identifies 
perspectivism as a shared notion  in  the  method  of  both  thinkers,  while discerning at the 
same time their difference. In Weber's case, perspectivism  is  taken  as merely subjective, 
while  in  Foucault's  case  perspectivism  is  rooted  in  'the  relation between forms of 
discourse, the historical struggle in which they arc immersed , the institutional practices to 
which they  are  linked,  and  the  forms  of  au thori ty  they presuppose'  (Dean,   1994, p. 7 
1).  Dean  further  discusses  in  detail  the critical  dimension of Foucault's analytic practices, 
distinguishing  the  terms  of  critique  and  criticism  in relation to the theoretical  baggage 
the  former  carries with  it.  In  Dean's analysis,  'unlike the Frankfurt notion of critique, 
criticism implies no necessary unity of its  object,  no necessary end  of the criticism, and  no 
necessary  and  universal  groun ds  from  which criticism is undertaken' (Dean, 1994, p. 1 1 9). 
Dean concludes that it is at this point that perspcctivism comes onto  the stage,  since once  
admitted  it allows  criticism  to enter  into the  space  of struggle  of discourses. 
The bulk  of  literature  that  deals  with  the  Foucauldian  historiography  primarily  draws on 
the 1971 essay 'Nietzsche, genealogy, history', where Foucault elaborates the notion of 
genealogy which will turn out to be the cornerstone of his work on power. It is to an 
overview  of  this  essay  that  I  now  turn . 
Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. (Foucault, in Rabinow, 
1986,   p. 76) 
Foucault has chosen  colour aspects to initiate his theorising of the Nietzschean method . 
Nietzschean genealogy is gray as contrasted  to English genealogy, which is blue, in the 
sense that, in searching the hum an interiority, it lacks specific directions and seems to be 
wa ndering about, as  if one were looking 'into the blu e' (Mahon, 1992, p. 86). It is the 
colour of the bulk of documents, the 'cyclopean monuments' in Nietzsche's words (cited 
in Mahon, 1992, p. 87), that give Nietzschean genealogy its grayness. History appears 
omnipresent in the 'gray' genealogy, while there is only a low level psychologism to be 
found in the 'blue type' of genealogy.3 Wh at is significantly different between the two 
colours is therefore the historical sense that turns out to be the bedrock on which 
Nietzschean genealogy rests. 
Genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of 
events outside  of any monotonous finali ty; it must seek them in t11e most 
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history--in sentiments, 
love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence not in order 
to trace the natural curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes 
where they engaged in different roles. Finally genealogy must define even those 
instances when they are absent, the moment when they remain unrealized. 
(Foucault, in  Rabinow,  1986, p. 76) 
As opposed to grand historical events, the genealogical search renders itself attentive to 
details, ma ny of them having remained unnoticed and unrecorded in the narratives of 
mai nstream history. By rejecting the teleological view of history, genealogy celebrates the 
philosophy of the event. The way things are is just an event, a random result of the 
interweavi ng of relations of powe r and domination. Genealogy as a method of analysis 
searches in the maze of dispersed events to trace discontinuities, recurrences and play 
where traditional historiograph y sees continuous developm ent, progress and seriousness. 
Therefore, Foucault sees genealogy as an 'eventaliza tion', a method that can attribute 
different dimensions to the ways traditional historians have dealt with the notion of the 
event. Even talization begins wi th the in terrogation of certain evidences of our culture on 
how things should be: 'making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation 
to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness 
which imposes itself uniformly on all' (Foucaul t, in Burchell et al., 1 991, p. 76). This 
breach of self-evidences also requires a rethinking of the various powe r relations that at 
a certain historical moment decisively influenced the way  things were socially and 
historically established. As Foucault notes, this rethinkin g reveals 'a sort of multiplication 
or pluralization of causes' (Foucault, in Burchell et al., 1 99 1 , p. 76). This means that the 
genealogist does not regard singularity as simply an isolated piece of dala to be added 
in his/her documents. The event under scrutiny is to be analysed within the matrix of 
discursive and non-discursive practices that have given rise to its existence. McNay (1992, 
p. 142) has commented that for Foucault genealogical histo.riography avoids the errors of
hermeneuticism that are inherent in mainstream forms of historical analysis. 
As I have already pointed out, a starting point of genealogy is that historically there 
arc no final 'truths' about our nature or the norms our reason dictates to us and therefore 
there is no essential, natural or inevitable way of grouping or classifying people. In this 
line of analysis, the genealogist does not look beyond or behind historical practices to find 
a simple unity of meaning or function, or a ch angeless significance of ourselves and the 
world around us. The aim is rather to look more closely at the workings  of  those 
practices  in  which   moral   norms  and  truths  about  ourselves  have  been  constructed. 
f nstead of going deep, looking for origins and hidden meanings, the analyst is working 
on the surface, constructing 'a polygon or rather a polyhedron' (Foucault, in Burchell et 
al., 199 1, p. 77) of various minor processes that surround the emergence of the event. 
What is to be remembered is the fact that the more the analysis breaks down practices, 
the easier it becomes to find out more about their interrelation, while this process can 
never have a final end. Genealogy introduces the problem of how by becoming 
constituted as subjects we come to be  subjected within particular  configurations. 
Therefore, what one should study in history are the anonymous deep configurations that 
determine the ways we are classified and grouped, the genealogy of the constitution of 
our 'politics'. Foucault concludes by noting that in this sense, eventalization leads to an 
increasing polymorphism realised first as a polymorphism of the related elements, second 
as a polymorphism of the actual relations and  third  as a polymorphism  of the domains 
of reference (Foucault, in Burchell el al., 1991, p. 77). A Foucault has very clearly stated, 
'I would like in short to resituate the production of true and false at the heart of historical 
analysis and political  critique'  (Foucault, in Burchell  el al., 1991, p. 77). 
Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it 
depends on a vast accumulation of source material. (Foucault, in Rabinow, 
1 986, p. 76) 
Clearly, the objects of these rigorous analyses  are socio-historical phenomena,  as 
Foucault has pointed out in the above essay (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 77). What 
remains unclear is the fundamental  nature  of the documents  under  scrutiny. Although 
the majority of them rest on the shelves of the Bibliotheque Nationale and the Bihliotheque du 
Saulchoir, where, according to his biographers, Foucault, a real 'archive-addict', spent a 
greal deal of his life;' there is something more vivid than pure archive material that 
animates Foucault's writings. It is well known that since the very beginning , Foucault's 
work attracted audiences much wider than the dryly academic. For the American James 
Miller ( 1993), one of Foucault's biographers, it is the philosophical life of the thinker, his 
active involvement in what he was actually searching and reflecting upon, that accounts 
for the freshness and timeliness of his themes and ideas. Foucault's 'documents' were also 
to be found in the asylums, within the political demonstrations occurring outside prisons, 
or in  the baths of San Francisco. Artaud's theatrical plays,  the literary work of Battaille, 
Blanchot's novels, a famous work of art such as las Meninas or an object such as a pipe 
could tum out to be objects of his inquiries.5 This polymorphous and diverse map of 
documents and sources leaves future genealogists with an important legacy: that of going 
on 'inventing' new sources and areas of research not yet thought of by the so-called 
humanist sciences, so as continually to rethink and call into question  the given truths of 
our world. 
Foucault conceives of genealogy as an analysis of descent and emergence and devotes a 
great deal of reflection upon these two terms, tracing their various uses and connotations 
in the Nietzschean  texts. 
Descent  records  the  the  objective  of  genealogy   and  is  opposed   to  a  pretended 
unification of the self. Instead of implying a search for origins, the analysis of descent 
traces the numberless beginnings not easily captured by the historian 's eye. As Paul 
Veyne has lucidly put it: 
Foucault has only one thing to say to historians: 'You may continue to explain 
history as you have always done. But be carefu l: if you look very closely, if you 
peel away the banalities, you will notice that there is more to explain than you 
thought; there are crooked contours that you haven 't spotted.' (Veyne, 1997, 
p. 156).
A genealogical analysis of descent does not attempt to reconstruct the past nor does it trace 
the effects of past events in the present. In the analysis of descC11t, the genealogist makes 
the effort to look directly at what people do, without taking anything for granted, witl10ut 
presupposing the existence of any goal, material cause or ideology. The rum is to strip 
away the veils that cover people's practices, by simply showing how they are, and where 
they come from, describing its complicated forms and exploring its countless historical 
transformations. As Paul Veyne has seen it, practice in Foucault 's thou ght 'is not some 
mysterious agency, some substratum of history, some hidden engine; it is what people do 
(the word says ju st what it means)' (Veyne,  l 997, p. 153). 
Thus, the analysis of descent disturbs previ ous immobile statements, fragments of unified 
truths, and exposes tl1e heterogeneity of previous consistencies. In the search for descmt 
it turns out  that 'truth or being docs not lie at the root of what we know and what we 
are' (Foucault, in Rabi now, 1986, p. 81). This conception is important in establishing the 
role of genealogy as critique. As I have already noted, the critical dimension of gen ealogy 
has been pointed out by several commentators. Finally tile analysis of descent reveals the 
total inscription of history on the body and everything that touches and surrounds the 
body. As Foucault notes, 'Genealogy as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by 
history and the process of history 's distinction  of the body' (Foucault, in Rabinow,  1986, 
p. 83). Both French and English-speaking tlleorists have drawn our attention  to  the
critical  role  played  by  the  body  in  the  genealogical  method .6   However,  it  is  in 
the feminist  strand  of Foucault  scholarship  that the importance attributed  to the  body 
in  his thought is particularly  underlin ed and discussed  in detail.7
The analysis of emergence must delineate the deployment of various processes and powe r 
relations in va rious system s of subjection ·within which things appeared as events on the 
stage of history. Emergence is attempting  to grasp the very 'moment of arising' in 
Fou cault's words (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 83), being aware that this is only an 
accidental moment, an episode, and not the ultim ate point of a historical evolution. 
'Emergence is thus the entry of forces' (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 84), the charting 
of the ba ttle of forces that resulted in a certain state of affairs. Since anythin g can just 
happen in such a battle, 'no one is responsible for an emergence, no one can glory in 
it, since it always occurs in the intersti ce' (Foucault, in Rabin ow, 1986, p. 85). In his 
analysis of the notion of emergence, Foucault seeks to detach his method from the 
'presentism' of historical studies, an approach that attempts to understand and in terpret 
past events in terms of tile present. Foucault has very clearly stated that he is not 
interested in 'w1iting a history of the past in term s of the present' (Foucault, 199 1 , p. 31). 
Comm enting on Foucault's rejection of the error of 'presentism ', Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1982) relate it to 'finalism ', an approach to history which discovers Lhe causal source of 
a present formation somewh ere in the past and then traces the series of con tin uous 
causalities that are supposed to reach the present. Therefore, if the analysis of emergence 
is the answer to presentism, then the analysis of descent is the answer to finalism and 
Foucault's methodology has broken with both. Most historians now  tend  to agree  that 
these are 'vices to be avoided' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 118). According to Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, in the analysis of emergence Foucault seems to get rid of the psychological 
baggage of Nietzsche, since he does not attribute causes and responsibilities to the tactics 
of individuals, but to strategies, plays of domination, and the struggle of forces (Foucault, 
in Dreyfus & Rabinow,  1982, p. 109). 
Genealogy, then, is the analysis of descent and emergence in the sense that these two 
notions are found in the work of Nietzsche and discussed in Foucault's influential essay. 
Foucault later elaborates in detail the relation between descent, emergence and traditional 
history. Setting aside Nietzsche's attacks against history, Foucault focuses on the concept 
of rustorical sense in Nietzsche, suggesting that 'the historical sense can become a 
privileged instrument of genealogy' once it is done with 'the certainty of absolutes' 
(Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 87). In considering the notion of historical sense in 
Nietzsche, Foucault rethinks the three Nietzschean modalities of traditional history, 
namely the monumental, antiquarian and c1itical history (cited in Mahon, 1992, p. 97) 
to which genealogy returns not to follow, but to metamorphose them. This return rests 
upon three anti-Platonic themes, which Foucault deploys in detail. 
First is the parodic, anti-realist theme as opposed to a 'remembering history', that 
offers subje cts identities borrowed from the glorious past. Genealogy reveals the mas- 
querade of past identities  and uses them in a playful manner as if there were some 
carnival party in which it were participating, so that 'the veneration of monuments 
becomes parody' (Foucau lt, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 97). Second is the dissociative theme, 
disrupting supposed historical continuity and dissolving coherent identities the fragments 
of which were kept together within the masks: 'the respect for ancient continuities 
becomes systematic dissociation' (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 97). Third is the 
sacrificial theme as directed against the knowing character of history and contesting 
the supposed neutrality and objectivity of the subject of knowledge: 'the critique of the 
injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present becomes the destruction of 
the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will lo knowledge' 
(Foucault in Rabinow, 1986, p. 97). As Foucault sees it, these three anti-Platonic themes 
that guide the return of genealogy to history, are constructive elements of counter- 
memory, a totally new dimension that transforms traditional historiography into an 
effective history. By disturbing the legends of the past, genealogy as effective history 
opens up paths for its subjects to set out for new, improbable identities. 
In the genealogist 's journey back lo history a series of methodological questions 
emerge: when and how can history turn out to be effective? A history renders itself 
effective when it develops the ability to distingu ish singularities, acknowledge differences , 
decentre man as the subject of historical becoming and shatter the certainties of our very 
existence. Effective history deals with events, 'shortens its vision lo those things nearest 
to it, ... studies what is closest, but so a to seize it al a distance' (Foucault, in Rabinow, 
1986, p. 89). In such a light, Foucault has seen his project as an 'ontology of lhe present ' 
(Foucault,  cited  in Dean,   1 994,  p. 50),  revealing  questions  of  enlightenment   as  its 
bedrock. A history of the present is, however , more interested in the future. Calling into 
question self-evidences of the present by exposing the various ways they were constructed 
in the past, such histories shatter certain stabilities and help us detach ourselves from our 
'truths' and seek ahernative ways of existence. In order for such transgressions to occur, 
however, effective histories should also break with our current systems of rationalisation 
and show that there is no truth but truths, no reason but rationalities, no knowledge but 
knowledges of the ways people have come to understand themselves and the world. As 
Rajchman (1985) has commented, by u sing history to problematise the subject, Foucault 
raises the question  of freedom, not  as a normative  category,  but as a 'real' situation 
of being, our possibility of questioning ourselves and modifying the politics of our 
existence.8
Doing Genealogy: how? 
What I have tried to do so far is not a systemati sation of Foucault 's background and of 
his philosophical orienta tions. Such an attempt would be at odds with Foucault's own 
problematisation of theoretical and epistem ological classifications. Moreover, it is widely 
known that in mainstream social and political theory, Foucault's work has been criticised 
for not employing recognisable methodologies, 'a non-historical historian, an anri- 
humanist human scientist, a counter-slructurali st structuralist' (cited in Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. xiv), and he him self occasionally made statements that have been 
quoted over and over again to illustrate the void Foucault created in any philosophical, 
historical or sociological dictionary of his time and afterwards: 'I don't feel it is necessary 
to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life is to become someone else you were 
not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the 
end, do you think you would have the courage to write it?' (Foucault, in Martin et al., 
1988, p. 9). 
What I have then tried to do is to  follow some of the routes of Foucault's intellectual 
journeys as well as to grasp the meanings of some of the theorists  who have dealt with 
his work. Jn focusing my attention on the emergence of genealogy as a set of 
methodological strategies for research, I have come to the conclusion that there is no way 
of truly understanding what genealogy is about, other than by concentrating on a 
genealogy per sc, analysing it in its minor details, reaching the most remote points of its 
network, revealing the hidden micro-mechanisms of its operation, grasping the most 
delicate aspects of its theorisation. This is the first stage that inevitably leads to the 
adventure of writing one's own genealogy. It is in the intermingling of these processes, 
understanding theory  and  practising  theory  that  I have  come  to  realise  the importance 
of an incident Jana Sawicki rem embers from her 1983 meeting with Foucault at  a 
seminar on 'technologies of the self at the University of Vermont: 'l told him that I had 
just finished writing a dissertation on his critique of humanism. Not surprisingly, he 
responded with some emba rrassment and much seriousness. He  suggested  that  I not 
spend energy talking about him and, instead do what he was doing, namely, write 
genealogies'  (Sawicki,  1 991, p. 15). 
lt is therefore to the stage of 'how to do a genealogy' that this paper now moves. In 
this context, let us see how Foucault's work of the 'meta-discursive '9 period can serve as 
an open paradigm of what doing a genealogy involves. 
Three domains of genealogy arc possible. First, a historical ontology  of 
ourselves in relation to trutl1 through which we constitute ourselves as subjects 
of knowledge; second a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of 
power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third , 
a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves 
as moral agents. (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 351) 
In sketching out the structure of his project Foucault has delineated the triangle of truth-
power-subject  in which  his  research  is applied  and  his genealogies  are  deployed. 
Although  these three genealogical domains often  meet, inform, overlap and sometimes 
juxtapose   or  even  contradict  each  other,  they  have  been  illustratively  inscribed  in 
Foucault's books. Each of these books marks a different genealogical era in his thought 
and  the  process  of  his  analyses.  In  tracing  'the  different  ways  in  our  culture  that 
human s develop knowledge  about themselves' (Foucault , in Martin et al., 1988, pp. 17- 
18), Foucault  tried  to unmask  certain  'truth  games'  and  relate  them  to  specific prac- 
tices,  'technologies  that  human  beings  used  to  und erstand  themselves'  (Foucault,  in 
.Martin et al., 1988, p. 8). As a real cartographer (Deleuze, 1992) Foucault again maps 
out four domains of such technologies: first the technologies of production, second  the 
technologies of sign systems, third the technologies of power, and fourth the technolo- 
gies of the self.  It is the first stage of this work that can be read in books such as The 
Birth of the Clinic,  the  Order of things and the  Archaeology of Knowledge,  where  Foucault 
seeks to isolate the first set of technologies that 'permit us to produce, transform, or 
manipulate things' (Foucault, in Martin et al.,  1988,  p.  18).  In  works  such  as  his 
inaugural lecture, w ide ly  known  as The Order of Discourse , Foucault elaborates theoreti- 
cally  the  second  set  of  technologies  'which  permit  us  to  use  signs,  meanings,  symbols, 
or significations' (Foucault , in Martin et al., 1 988, p. 18). In these domains of technologies 
Foucault's analyses still rem ain heavily  'discourse  oriented' although  the  institutional 
practices have begun lo  emerge  in  the  ba ckground .  As  Foucault  dramatically pointed  out  
in  his  inaugural  lecture: 
The institution replies: you should not be afraid  of  beginnings;  we  are  all 
here in order to show you that discourse belongs  to the order of laws, that we 
have long been looking after its appearance, that a  place  has  been  made 
ready for it, a place which honours it but disarms it; and that  if discourse 
may sometimes have some power, nevertheless it is from us and us alone th at 
il gets it (Foucault, in Young, 1981, p. 52) 
The  reassuring  institution  that  appears  to  protect  but  al  the  same  time  direct  or 
eliminate  'the  order  of  discourse'  flourishes,  develops  and  is  analysed  to  its   minor 
details beh ind the Wcbe1;an 'i ron cages'. These 'iron cages',  however,  are  put   in  a 
different context and a different analytical  course  in  Foucault 's  works  that,  like  the 
world famous Discipline and Punish, focus on the third set of techniques, 'technologies of 
power which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or 
domination, an objectivising of the subject' (Foucault, in Martin et al., 1988, p . 1 8). The 
technologies  of  power  are  in  the  heart  of  the  elaboration  of   govemmentality,   a 
thematic that traverses all of  Foucault 's later  work  and  turns  out  to  be  bound to  the last 
area of practices, the 'technologies of the self, which  permit  individuals to  effect, by their 
own means, or  with  the  help  of  others  a  certain  number  of  operations  on  their own 
bodies, and souls, thoughts,  conduct  and  way  of  being  so  as  to  transform themselves, in 
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality' (Foucault 
, in Martin et al., 1 988, p. 18). Governing  oneself  and  governing others are interwoven in 
the  problematics  that  arise  from  the  exploration  of  the  last two  sets  of  technologies. 
The  Use of  Pleasure  and   The  Care of  the  Seif  are  Foucault 's only   studies  about   the 
technologies of the self that were published as books. I t is well known that these two 
books appeared shortly before his death, in 1984, and after Foucault  had  passed 
through  a long period  of contemplation  and  recollection , which  followed  the  publi- 
cation of the first volume of his History of Sexuality, in 1976. It was a period during
which , Foucault's 'passing' to genealogy was  theoretically  established. It  was  moreover 
a period that, as Braidotti has commented, brought forward a new epistemological 
category: the technology of the subject, 'according to which power produces the real 
through the processes of normali zation that it adopts and the regions of truth it institutes' 
(Braidotti , 1991, p. 86). It has thus signalled a critical turning point in Foucault's 
genealogies of the  modem  subject, by  bringing  together  most rigorously, and in an 
exemplary way, the three genealogical axes of truth , power and the subject  which 
traverse the whole  body  of  Foucault's  analyses.10  Apart  from  his  books,  however, 
Foucault 's most 'mature' and elaborated ideas about the writing of genealogies of  the 
subject  are dispersed  in  various  essays,  lecture  transcripts, interviews and  course notes. 
Technologies of the Self (Martin  et al., 1988) is a collection of essays, based on the lectures 
and discussions of the Vermont seminar and it is to these lectures that I now turn. 
Technologies of the Self 
Foucault begins his first lecture on technologi es of the self by clearly defining sexuality 
as his dispositij. But what is a dispostif? 
Foucault has written that a starting point for 'doing genealogies' should be to focus on 
a pa1t.icular problem and then try to see it in its historical dimension; how this problem 
turned out to be the way we perceive it today. 11 
Dreyfus and Rabinow ( 1982) point out that in searching for the problem the analyst 
should identify some socially sh ared 'discomfort' about how things arc going. Of cou rse 
there is always the problem that not all social groups can have shared concerns. The 
perspective of the analyst is decisive in focusing on a particular problem and this should 
be admitted and used by the analyst in an attempt to deconstruct possible arbitrary 
personal feelings and stances with regard co his/her project. J n Nietzsche, Genealogy, History 
Foucault wrote that genealogy is effective history understood as the 'affirmation of 
knowledge as perspective' (cited in Simons, 1995, p. 9 1). As Simons has commented, 'the 
perspective affirmed is tJ1at of those who resist' (Simons, 1995, p. 9 1). 
Following the first step of isolating the problem , the analyst is tracing the current 
practices that cou ld relate to the diagnosed 'problem' and finally she or he is trying to 
fo1mulate the network of relations between the practices and the problem. Situating the 
problem in a system of relations that can account for the socially shared discomfort is a 
turning point for 'doing genealogy' and is immediately related to the Foucauldian 
methodological concept of dispositif.12
As Foucault sees it, a dispositif is a system of relations that can be established between 
heterogeneous elements, discursive and non-discursive practices, 'the said as well as the 
un said' (Foucault, in Gordon , 1980, p. 194). A dispositif can include 'discourses, institu- 
tions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statemen ts, philosophic propositions , morality, philanthropy,  etc.'  (Foucault, in  Gordon , 
1 980, p. 194). There is always 'an urgent need' (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980, p. 195) to 
which the functioning of the dispositif responds: 'the dispositif is essentially of a strategic 
nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain  manipu lation  of relations 
of  forces,  either  developing  in  a  particular  direction,  blocking them,  stabilising  them, 
u tilising them , etc.' (Foucault , in Gordon , I 980, p. 196). Being inscribed in a play of 
power the dispositif also relates to certain types of knowledge that derive from it, but also 
condition it. In Foucault's view therefore the analyst has a dispositif when she or he has 
succeeded in isolating a cluster of power relations sustaining and being  sustained  by 
certain  types  of knowledge (Foucault, in  Gordon , 1980,  p.  196). 
Deleuze has underlined two important consequences arising from a philosophy of 
dispositifs: the rejection of universals and a drive away from the Eternal and towards the 
new. As he has pointed out, in each dispositif it is necessary to distinguish the historical 
part, what we are (what we arc already no longer) and the current part, what we are in 
the process  of becoming  (Dclcuze, in  Armstrong,   1992, pp. 163-164). 
Following the 'announcement' of his dispositif, Foucault puts together the different 
elements 'discursive and non discursive' that concerned him in sketching out the diagram 
of his inquiries. 13 It is significant that a genealogy should start with a major interrogation 
of what has been accepted as the 'truth', any truth concerning the ways individuals 
understand themselves as subjects of this world. The genealogy is thus starting by 
shattering any certainties, without this questioning being a rhetorical one, asking so as to 
present pre-existent  answers. In posing genealogical questions one can never be sure that 
one could ultimately find any 'satisfactory answers'. This is the risk, the adventure and 
the fascination  of the exercise. 
Foucault places his inquiries on the development of technologies of the self in two 
different periods: the first two centuries of the Roman empire in the context of 
problematisations of the Graeco-Roman philosophy, and the fourth and fifth centuries of 
the late Roman empire, dominated by Christian spirituality. However, he points out that 
the set of practices under scrutiny in both periods were initially formed as an area of 
philosophical interest in the classical period. As Foucault explains, these practices were 
constituted in Greek as epimelesthai sautou, 'to take care of yourself’, 'the concern with the 
self , 'to be concerned, to take care of yourself, which turned out to be one of the main 
principles of the life of citizens. 
Foucault traces the historical development of the 'care for oneself from the Platonic 
dialogue of Alkibiades, to the period of the Stoics and finally to the era of Christian 
asceticism. As a genealogist, Foucau lt works hard to trace the emergence and develop- 
ment of the practices of self-formation. In his discussion of the Platonic thought, he paints 
the historical as well as the philosophical background of the Socratic dialogues, and starts 
to weave the nexus of texts, where the care of the self is being analysed in its relation 
to, as well as its difference and contradictions with, the Delphic principle of gnothi sauton, 
'know  yourself. 
Foucault is careful with minor textual details, scrupulously citing his examples, 
commenting on their  structure, following the 'order of their discourse', comparing and 
juxtaposing them, tracing  their  repetition,  recurrence  or even  disappearance  in relation 
lo the era, the philosophical school or even the historical personalities they were adopted 
by. 
In the process of such discussion the 'conclusions' seem to emerge naturally like the 
subtle drawing of a veil, so easy and simple lo uncover but al the same time so difficult 
to imagine uncovering. The technologies arc thus revealed, then named, defined and 
categorised. Despite or perhaps because of his continuous criticism of categorisations, 
Foucault turns out to be exceptionally effective in forming structures, groups and 
categories  and  placing  them in an order. His genealogical  texts  are full of meticulous 
diagrams, sketches and outlines that systematise the route of his thought and his findings. 
There arc definitions: 'the theme of the care of the self took the form of an attitude' 
(Foucault, 1 990, p. 45), subtle discernments: 'pure practices of the self and social 
practices of care where communication with others is also involved', classifications of 
self-practices: 'self-examination, speaking and writing about oneself, writing letters, 
remembering, the an of  listening,  tl1e  interpretation  of  dreams'  (Foucault,  1990, 
pp.  34-35). 
Foucault is careful enough to examine the historical conditions for the emergence of 
the technologies he is analysing. 14 He is also attentive to the chronological ordering of 
the themes he analyses: 'The examination of conscience begins with this letter writing. 
Diary comes later' (Foucault, in Martin el al., 1988, p. 30). Foucault is very much 
interested in the biographical elements of the subjects who practise or are taught how to 
practise technologies of the self. Thus, he carefully paints Alkibiades' portrait so as to 
construct his argument about the pedagogical character of the cultiva tion of the self and 
its interrelation with both eros or philosophical love and politics: 'During his adolescence 
Alkibiades was desirable ... but now he wants to dominate others ... he is embarrassed 
and confused' (Foucault, in Martin et al., 1988, p. 24). The discursive order by which 
technologies of th e self are introduced and developed in philosophical texts is also 
examined in detail: 'How is this question introduced into the dialogue? (Foucault, in 
Martin et al., 1988, p. 25). 
Keeping his genealogical writings gray, Foucault always  systematises hjs otherwise 
overflowi ng thought by formin g conclusions, tables and groups of notions:  'This early 
text ... sets out four main problems to endure throughout antiquity' (Foucault, in Martin 
el al., 1988, p. 26). He is also weaving systematically the nexus of the powe r relations, the 
historical and cultural conditions, and the practices under scrutiny by drawing new lines 
and making interconnections among the different points of his constructed diagrams: 'In 
the Hellenistic and imperial periods  ..."care of the self' was accepted by Epicurus, ... the 
Cynics, and by such Stoics as ... The Pythago reans gave attention lo the notion of an 
ordered  life in common' (Foucault, in Martin  et al.,  1988). 
The genealogical analysis finally notes the limits imposed by the social  conditions 
within which practices of the self are cultivated: 'it being understood of course that this 
phenomenon concerned only the social groups, very limited in number,  that  were 
bearers of culture and for whose members a tee/me tau biou could have a meaning and a 
reality' (Foucault,  1990, p. 45). 
A deployn1cnt of Foucault's techniques and practices can never be exhaustive or 
finalised. Foucault's originality lies in his strategic use of different discourses and 
approaches in the writing of his genealogies. Each reading of these genealogies reveals 
hidden layers of attentive and detailed research of an immense variety of data. Rather 
than following methodological principles, Foucault's genealogies create a methodological 
rhythm of their own, weaving around a set of crucial questions, already introduced in the 
beginning of this paper. What is happening now? What is this present of ou rs? How have 
we become what we are and what are the possibilities of becoming 'other'? Such 
questions create unexplored and even unthought areas of investigation. Foucault's 
genealogies do not offer methodological 'certainties'. They persistently evade 
classification , but they do inspire the writing of new genealogies to interrogate the truths 
of our world. 
NOTES 
I. Sec  Foucault  in  'The ethic  of  care  for  the  self  as  a  practice  for  freedom',  in J. Bernaucr  and 
D. Rasmussen ( 1988). 
2. These theories include the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and Emile Benvcniste, Louis 
Althusser's theory of ideology, the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, Jacques
Derrida's theory of 'difference' and Gilles Deleuze's philosophical projcc1 of liberating all thinking from 
its subjection to a univocal image of thought and meaning. The discourses of the crisis of modernity have 
onl)' recently included a growing number of feminists who arc doing research into theory, politics and 
subjectivity. 
3. As Ma.hon notes, the key elements of Nietzschean genealogy emerge in opposition to an alternative
genealogical approach: that of Paul Ree and the English psychologists with whom Nietzsche associates
Rec. For  the work  of Paul  Ree  sec in  Mahon,  1992, pp. 82, 86,  109,  139 
4. Sec Eribon,  1989; Macey, 1993; Miller, 1993.
5. Sec Foucault,  1983. 
6. Francois  Ewald  has  noted  tha1 'genealogy  adopts  the point  of view  of the  body,  that  of the  tortured ,
trained , branded, mutilated , decomposed, constrained , subjcc1cd  body, that of the body which  is divided, 
organised, separated, and reunited ' (cited in Mah on,  1992, p. 9). In his influential study Michel Foucault·
the will to truth, Alan Sheridan has commented extensively on what he calls the 'power-body' conjunction in
Foucault, which  he sees  as directly inherited  from  Nietzsche  (Sheridan,  1990). 
7. See Weedon, 1987; Nicholson, 1990; Buttler, 1 990, 1993; Sawicki, 1991; McNay, 1992, 1994; Probyn,
1993. 
8. 'Our real freedom docs not consist either in 1clling our true s1ories and finding our place within some
tradition or ethical code, in completely determining our actions in accordance w i t h  u n i v e r s a l
principles or in accepting our existential limitations in authentic self relation. We are on the contrary
"really" free because we can question and modify those systems which make (only) particular kinds of
action possible, and because there is no ''authentic" self-relation we must conform to' (Rajchman ,
1985, p. 122). 
9. Without abandoning archaeology, which involved variants of a strict analysis  of  discourse,  Foucault
moved beyond the limitations of discourse analysis and became more attentive to that "which conditions,
limits  and  institutionalises discursive  formations,  namely genealogy. 
I 0.  Dews (1987) has seen this period a Foucault's 'late return to the subject'. However other thinkers speak 
of a redefinition of 1hc subject in Foucault through a rejection of certain humanist assumptions about its 
existen ce (Simons, 1995, p. 78). What feminist analysts have identified as most problematic about the 
technologies of subjcct.ivi1y, h owever, is that the 'self, Foucault theorises, refers to a desexualised and 
general 'human subject', where gender difference is simply insignificant. Sec, among others, de Lauretis, 
1987; Braidotti, 1991, 1994. 
1 1. 'I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and I 1ry lo work out its genealogy. 
Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question pod in the present ' (Foucault, in Kritzman 
Laurence,   1988, p. 262). 
1 2 . Dispositif has been translated in English as 'apparatus' but according lo Dreyfus and Rabinow the term
remains excessively vague. With  some  preoccupations  they  instead  suggest  'grid  of  intelligibility'.
See Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p. 120). 
1 3 . 'I asked myself: how had the subject been compelled to decipher himself in regard to what was
forbidden? It is a question of the relation between asceticism and truth' (Martin et al., 1988, p. 17). 
1 4 . Thu s he stresses the way the care of the self was driven in different directions as a result of the
disappearance of the city states and the emergence of empires . 
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